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Abstract:  This paper shows that many East Asian firms are significantly exposed to 
foreign exchange risk.  Their exposure appears to be much more widespread than is typical 
for the large, western industrialized economies.  The paper also shows that exchange rate 
pegs appear to do little to alleviate this widespread exposure against currencies other than 
the peg.  The East Asian firms studied here are most exposed to fluctuations in the U.S. 
dollar, and the mark and yen are important in a few countries.  The extent of their 
exchange rate exposure has varied, but not diminished, over the last decade.  The most 
widespread exchange rate sensitivity (not just the most exchange rate fluctuation) occurred 
during the Asian Crisis period; this is evident even after accounting for the local 
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I.  Introduction 
As recent international financial events have demonstrated, an exchange rate crisis 
can expand quickly into a broader financial and economic crisis.  The rapid expansion of 
exchange rate crises beyond the foreign exchange markets reflects in part the importance 
of the exchange rate to firm profitability.  Exchange rates affect profitability through many 
routes.  First, they affect directly those firms with financial assets and liabilities (most 
notably debt) denominated in foreign currency and those firms with foreign operations.  In 
addition, through their effect on foreign competition and domestic macroeconomic 
conditions, exchange rates also can impact the profitability of firms with no foreign 
currency revenues at all.
1  Thus, a potentially wide range of firms could be exposed to 
movements in foreign exchange rates, regardless of their direct financial exposure. 
Most empirical studies of exchange rate exposure to date have focused on western 
industrial countries, and most have found only modest exposure.  In contrast, we focus on 
East Asian countries, and we find that their experience has been different.  Our sample of 
countries includes some that differ markedly from the large, western economies in terms of 
their size, participation in international trade and borrowing, and financial development.  
Just as importantly, they provide variation in the exchange rate arrangements both across 
countries and during the sample period.  A country’s exchange rate arrangement 
fundamentally defines the terms on which its economic interactions with the rest of the 
world are conducted, and it determines the course of domestic monetary policy.  Hence, at 
a most basic level, the arrangement can impact exchange rate exposure.  For these reasons, 
one might expect the exposure of East Asian firms to vary across countries and time, and 
                                                 
1.  Marston (2001) provides a model that focuses carefully on cash flows and industry structure to explain 
when  exposure depends only on its net foreign currency revenues and when it depends on other variables. 2 
to differ from existing evidence reporting only minimal levels of exchange rate exposure.  
This paper evaluates the extent of foreign exchange exposure among firms in East Asian 
countries and examines whether the exposure is linked to the use of an exchange rate peg. 
  There have been several recent studies focusing on the macroeconomic effects of 
currency arrangements (e.g., Ghosh et. al., 1996, and Parsley and Popper, 2001) and on the 
impact of currency arrangements on trade (e.g., Rose, 2000).  However, we know of only 
one other study that has examined the potential link between currency arrangements and 
the extent of firm-level exchange rate exposure, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), which 
examines the exposure of Swedish firms.  In this paper, we are able to study the link 
between currency arrangements and exposure both across countries and over time.  
Specifically, we examine the exchange rate exposure of publicly traded firms in nine East 
Asian countries since 1990; these include Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, 
the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand.  Then, in addition to examining the link 
between exposure and exchange rate arrangements, we also ask whether their exposure 
over the last twelve years has changed, and we compare their exposure to that of two 
benchmark countries, Australia and New Zealand, and to the exposure reported in the 
earlier studies.  We measure foreign exchange exposure both in terms of the residual 
exposure that is left after accounting for the aggregate, local market return, and in terms of 
the total exposure, which includes both the local market exposure and the residual 
exposure.
2  
  Our findings can be summarized easily.  First, many East Asian firms show 
significant exposure to fluctuations in one or more of the four major currencies: the U.S. 
                                                 
2. In emphasizing the distinctions between residual and total exposure, we are following Bodnar and Wong 
(2000). 3 
dollar, the deutschmark, the yen, and the pound.  This finding contrasts with the results of 
past studies, few of which have found much exchange rate exposure at all.
3, 4 Second, we 
find that countries with exchange rates that are fixed against a single currency (as is usual) 
exhibit no less exposure against the other major currencies.  Finally, we find that the 
exchange rate exposure has not diminished over time. 
 
II.  Gauging Foreign Exchange Exposure 
To gauge foreign exchange exposure, we follow in the tradition of Adler and 
Dumas (1984).  They define foreign exchange exposure in terms of a regression of asset 
value on the exchange rate.  Our work also builds closely on that of Dahlquist and 
Robertsson (2001), Dominguez and Tesar (2001a, 2001b), Wong (forthcoming), Bodnar 
and Marston (forthcoming), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), Chamberlain, Howe, and Popper 
(1997), Chow, Lee, and Solt (1997), Bodnar and Gentry (1993), and Jorion (1990) who all 
take related approaches.  In keeping with most of this work, we first estimate the exposure 
conditional on market returns.  This approach allows us to compare our results with the 
other key studies of exchange rate exposure, and it means that our gauge of exposure will 
measure what Bodnar and Wong (2000) call “residual” exposure.  As Bodnar and Wong 
stress, estimating conditional exposure using the market return implicitly controls for many 
                                                 
3. Most of those studies have focused on firms in the United States or in large European countries.  By and 
large, they have estimated the firm exposure to a weighted-average of exchange rates.  One important 
exception is Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001), who use individual exchange rates and find exposure among 
Swedish firms.  Other exceptions (in terms of finding significant exposure) include Chamberlain, Howe, and 
Popper (1997) who find exchange rate exposure for U.S. banks using trade-weighted exchange rates, and 
Chow, Lee, and Solt (1997) who find exposure at long horizons.  
4. The absence of observable exposure may reflect hedging by firms.  Bodnar and Marston (forthcoming) 
provide evidence that operational hedging may have been important in reducing the exposure of many U.S. 
firms.   Financial hedges are examined by Allayannis and Ofek (2001), and by Chamberlain, Howe, and 
Popper (1997).  Both studies find the use of derivatives to be associated with reduced exposure.  (Allayannis 
and Ofek examine U.S. nonfinancial firms;  while Chamberlain, Howe, and Popper examine U.S. banks.)  4 
of the variables other than exchange rates that affect returns.  We include measures of both 
local and world market returns.  This makes the estimates both more stable and more 
meaningful.  Of course, it also means that the exposure measure excludes the local 
market’s average sensitivity to the exchange rate, as it is reflected in the local market 
return.  To make sure that our findings are not driven by this aspect of our specification, 
we also estimate exposure leaving out the local market return, and we report those 
estimates in the Section IV.  
Our treatment of the exchange rate itself differs somewhat from most of these other 
studies, however, in that we use individual exchange rates, rather than a trade-weighted 
exchange rate.  In this regard, we take the same approach as do Dahlquist and Robertsson, 
who use individual currencies to examine the exposure of hundreds of Swedish firms.
5  
Dahlquist and Robertsson emphasize that the exposure shows up more clearly when the 
individual exchange rates are used.  Furthermore, they argue convincingly that past studies 
may have missed seeing foreign exchange exposure because it was masked by the 
aggregation of trade-weighted indices.  In our case, the use of individual currencies is also 
supported by the fact that the currencies in the sample show enough independent variation 
against the major exchange rates that we are able to distinguish differences in their 
importance for firm returns.   
As mentioned above, our sample includes firms from Hong Kong, Indonesia, 
Japan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand, and the 
benchmark countries, Australia and New Zealand.  We examine the exposure of firms in 
these countries to fluctuations in their currencies against the U.S. dollar, the deutschmark, 
                                                 
5. Allayannis and Ofek also use individual exchange rates to check the robustness of their original results, 
which use a trade-weighted exchange rate. 5 
the yen, and the pound.  The sample extends from January 1990 through March 2002 and 
includes an average of eighty firms per country.   
The stock return data are taken from DataStream.  For each country, we examine 
the returns of the largest firms included in the major market index.  When possible, we use 
the returns from the largest 100 firms.  When returns from fewer than 100 firms are 
available, we use all of the available firms in the index.  The list of firms, and their 
industry classification and each market value are given in a long Appendix available from 
the authors.   
In Table 1, we report the correlations among weekly observations of the major 
currencies against the currencies of each of the countries in our sample.  As the table 
shows, the correlations are not uniformly high.  In particular, the value of every country’s 
currency against the dollar shows little correlation with its value against the other major 
currencies.  This suggests it may be informative to include the exchange rates separately, 
rather than using only a trade-weighted exchange rate. 
To estimate exchange rate exposure itself, we add fluctuations in all four currencies 
to a time series regression of each firm’s excess return on a constant and on the excess 
market returns.  That is, we estimate the parameters βUS$, βDM, β£ and β¥ (along with γ0, γh, 
and γw) in the following equation: 
(1)  t i t t t DM DM t US US t w w t h h t i u s s s s r r r , , £ £ , ¥ ¥ , $, $ , , 0 , + + + + + + + = β β β β γ γ γ  
 
 
where time and individual firms are indexed by t and by i; and, excess returns and 
exchange rate changes are defined below.  
  t i r,   ≡   Return on equity i, less the return to the local short-term 
government asset. 6 
  t w r ,   ≡  International market return less the U.S 90 day T-bill return, 
denominated ex post in local currency. 
  t h r ,   ≡  Local market return less the local short-term government asset. 
  t US s $,  ≡  Nominal local currency appreciation or depreciation against the 
U.S. dollar. 
  t DM s ,  ≡  Nominal local currency appreciation or depreciation against the 
German mark. 
  t s , ¥   ≡  Nominal local currency appreciation or depreciation against the 
Japanese yen. 
  t s , £   ≡  Nominal local currency appreciation or depreciation against the 
U.K. pound. 
  t i u ,   ≡ Regression  residual. 
Table 2 summarizes some of the key results of the estimation of Equation 1 using 
weekly returns.  The estimates suggest that exchange rate fluctuations are important for 
many of the firms in many, but not all, of the countries.  Moreover, the major currencies 
are not equally important.  The first four columns give the fraction of firms that exhibit 
exposure to the dollar, the deutschmark, the yen, and the pound.  That is, for each country, 
Columns 1 though 4 give the fraction of firms for which we can reject at the five percent 
significance level the separate hypotheses that βUS$ = 0, βDM = 0, β£ = 0, and β¥ = 0.  As 
shown in the first column, sizable shares of firms in most of the countries appear to be 
exposed to fluctuations in the U.S. dollar.  Over half of the Korean, Philippine, and 
Indonesian firms exhibit significant exposure to the dollar.  The mark and yen appear to be 
important to a notable share of firms in only a few countries – the yen in Hong Kong and 
Singapore, and the mark in Taiwan.  Fluctuations in the pound do not appear to matter 
much at all.  Most notably, the pound matters not a whit in Hong Kong. 
We also test the hypothesis that all the exchange rate coefficients equal zero.  That 7 
is, for each firm, we test the joint hypothesis, H0: 0 £ ¥ $ = = = = β β β β DM US .  Column 5 
of Table 1 gives the fraction of firms in each country for which the hypothesis is rejected at 
the five percent significance level.  That fraction is well above five percent in most of the 
countries.  In those countries with many of their firms exposed to individual currencies – 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines – the fraction is quite high, above 40 
percent.  Column 6 gives the median 
2 R  of the regressions in each country; and column 7 
gives the number of firms we observe in each country.  Of course, as mentioned above, 
these exposures are “residual” exposures.  That is, because they are conditioned on the 
local excess return, they do not reflect aggregate exposure experienced by the local market 
as a whole.  We estimate the exposure inclusive of the aggregate local effect in Section 4.   
Before proceeding to an analysis of exposure over time we address one potentially 
important issue.  Namely, we would like to know whether the results in Table 2 are 
spurious.  In particular, it is possible that we would find ‘significance’ in similar 
regressions using four purely random variables in place of the returns on the dollar, the 
mark, the yen, and the pound.  That is, since we include all four exchange rates in the 
regressions, we may be biasing upward our chances of statistical significance.  To address 
this concern we conduct a series of Monte Carlo simulations by substituting pseudo-
exchange rate changes in each regression.  These simulations, reported in Appendix Table 
1, confirm that the evidence in Table 2 is not spurious.  Using simulated data we fail to 
find abnormal levels of ‘exposure’.  We now turn to an examination of changes over time 
in measured exposure. 
The sample period, 1990 to 2002, spans many important changes in the economic 
environment of these countries.  In addition to the dramatic macroeconomic changes of the 8 
nineties, there have been sweeping financial reforms in many of the countries, including a 
liberalization of the regulation of foreign exchange derivatives, which can be used to hedge 
some exposure.
6  Therefore, we also examine how the foreign exchange exposure has 
varied over time.  We split the full sample into four periods.  Each period is three years 
long: 1990 to 1992, 1993 to 1995, 1996 to1998, and 1999 to 2002.  Notice that the third 
period, 1996 to 1998 includes the Asian Crisis and its immediate aftermath.  We add 
interactive time dummies to Equation 1 to capture the period-by-period exposure.
7  This 
gives us the following regression equation: 
(2)     t i
j
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β β β β γ γ γ  
where each  j D is a dummy variable: 
1 D    = 1, January 1, 1990 through December 31, 1992 
  = 0, otherwise 
2 D   = 1, January 1, 1993 through December 31, 1995 
  = 0, otherwise 
3 D   = 1, January 1, 1996 through December 31, 1998 
  = 0, otherwise 
4 D   = 1, January 1, 1999 through March 7, 2002 
  = 0, otherwise 
Table 3 summarizes the estimation results.  We again report the fraction of firms 
for which we can reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the exchange rate change is 
zero.  Here, we report the fraction for each of the major currencies in each period.  As 
                                                 
6.  If firms have increased their use of derivatives to hedge their foreign exchange exposure, we might expect 
to find that exposure has fallen over time.  Chamberlain, Howe and Popper (1997) find that U.S. firms that 
report using foreign exchange derivatives indeed do exhibit lower foreign exchange exposure than the firms 
that do not.  Chiao and Hung (2000) consider the timing of financial liberalizations in Taiwan, and link the 
liberalizations to changes in the foreign exchange exposure of exporting firms.   
7.  Allowing the parameters γ0, γh, and γw to vary as well (see Appendix Table 2) does not qualitatively affect 
our conclusions. 9 
might be expected, for many countries and sub-periods, the hypothesis is rejected for fewer 
firms than when the entire period is used.  Overall, we find nothing to suggest that foreign 
exchange exposure has fallen over the sample period.  The third period, the one 
encompassing the Asian Crisis, shows the most exposure – particularly to fluctuations in 
the dollar; and in many countries exposure is substantial in the final period as well.   
As shown in the first column, only Japan and Hong Kong provide very many 
rejections during the first period, 1990 to 1992.  Just over a quarter of the firms in Hong 
Kong appear to have been exposed to the yen; and 18 percent of the Japanese firms appear 
to have been exposed to the dollar.  In the second period, shown in column 2, more than 
half of the Japanese firms show some exposure to the dollar, and about a third of the 
Taiwanese firms appear to be exposed to the pound.  During the third period, more than 
half of the firms in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, and the Philippines appear to be exposed 
to the dollar.  About a quarter of the Japanese firms appear to be exposed to the dollar, but 
nearly a third exhibit exposure to the mark.  In the most recent period, shown in column 4, 
many of the firms in Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand appear to be exposed to fluctuations in 
the dollar; and about a third of the Malaysian firms appear to be exposed to fluctuations in 
the yen.  Finally, few firms in our benchmark countries, Australia and New Zealand, show 
significant exposure to any of the major currencies during any of the periods.  
Together, Tables 2 and 3 suggest that residual exchange rate exposure is significant 
for many firms in East Asia and in many periods.  While not restricted either to the dollar 
or to the crisis period, evidence of exposure is strongest against the dollar, and it is 
strongest around the time of the crisis.   
 10 
III.  Exposure and Exchange Rate Arrangements 
Having gauged the residual foreign exchange exposure, we next examine its 
empirical link to exchange rate arrangements.  It is sometimes argued that a fixed exchange 
rate regime offers a hospitable environment for business by providing stability and 
removing the need for expensive hedging.  However, even in the rare case of a stable 
exchange rate peg, the exchange rate cannot be fixed independently against more than one 
currency.  If it is fixed against, say, the U.S. dollar, it is left to fluctuate freely against the 
yen and the euro.  So, firms remain exposed to foreign exchange risk even when their 
currency officially is fixed.  A firm’s value may be quite sensitive to exchange rate 
fluctuations in this setting.  In contrast, firms in countries with freely floating currencies 
may be accustomed to hedging, and hedging may be less costly in such countries.  Thus, it 
is not clear which arrangement will see more foreign exchange exposure overall.   
The exchange rate arrangements themselves entail mixtures of various monetary 
instruments.  While in the countries that we study the arrangement is identified easily, it is 
nevertheless indivisible from the monetary conditions that surround it.  That is, an 
exchange rate arrangement represents a monetary environment, not a single policy 
instrument.  This fact has implications for our empirical work.  It precludes us from 
separating the role of the exchange rate arrangement from the role of the supporting 
monetary variables.  What we examine, then, is the empirical link between foreign 
exchange exposure and the monetary environment, the signature of which is the exchange 
rate arrangement.   
We look separately at exposure under the alternative arrangements that exist in our 
sample.  Specifically, we look at the exposure under an exchange rate peg, and we look at 11 
the exposure without one.  To do so, we estimate the following regression: 
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where Dp,t equals one when the firm’s home currency is pegged against another currency 
and equals zero otherwise; and, the subscript m indexes the major currencies.  We are 
interested in the parameters β p and β n, which provide separate pegged and nonpegged 
exposure estimates for the firms in countries that have had experience both with and 
without a peg during the sample period.  
  To be useful, this specification requires that the firm’s home country have 
experience with both pegged and nonpegged arrangements.  This limits the estimation to 
Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan, and Thailand.  We use the de facto 
exchange rate arrangements; that is, we identify the dates of the exchange rate peg by 
observing the behavior of the exchange rates, not by observing the officially reported 
arrangement.  This results in the dates given in the notes to Table 4.  The table itself 
summarizes the findings from estimating Equation 3.   
As shown in the first column, far more firms show statistically significant exposure 
to the dollar with a peg than without one in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand.  This 
exposure arises despite the fact that the pegs themselves are essentially tied to the dollar in 
these countries.  As shown in the third column, exposure to the yen is even more evident, 
with widespread yen exposure occurring in all of the countries under their pegs.  Under a 
peg, more than half the firms in Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines, and nearly 
a third of the firms in Taiwan and Thailand, show significant exposure to fluctuations in 12 
the yen.  Without a peg, only Taiwanese firms exhibit a notable yen exposure.  With or 
without a peg, there is much less exposure against the mark and the pound, shown in 
columns 2 and 4.  Overall, the table illustrates that the extent of foreign exchange exposure 
has been much more widespread with a peg than without one.  This suggests that an 
exchange rate peg does not mitigate the effects of exchange rate fluctuations on firm 
profitability. 
 
IV.  Total Exposure 
Bodnar and Wong (2000) emphasize that “residual” exposure estimates – such as 
those we’ve just described and those that now are conventionally reported – measure the 
deviation of the firms’ exposure from the exposure of the market portfolio as a whole.  
Even when a firm shows no significant exposure in the specifications we have used so far, 
the firm nevertheless may be exposed to exchange rate fluctuations if the market return 
covaries with the exchange rate.  In order to measure the firm’s exposure as a whole, we 
drop the local and world returns from Equation 1.  That is, we estimate the exchange rate 
coefficients in the following regression: 
(4)   t i t t t DM DM t US US t i u s s s s r , , £ £ , ¥ ¥ , $, $ 0 , + + + + + = β β β β γ . 
The results are reported in Table 5.   
In most ways, the results are very similar to the findings for residual exposure.  Of 
the four major currencies, the dollar is still the most important for returns.  More than half 
of the firms in Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore still appear to be exposed 
to the dollar.  The results for Hong Kong are little changed:  as before, about a quarter of 
the firms show significant exposure to the yen, and none appear to be exposed to the 13 
pound.   
On the other hand, there are some differences.  Even more firms in Singapore 
appear to be exposed to the dollar, while their exposure to the yen has disappeared.  
Surprisingly, most Japanese firms now appear to be exposed to the pound (many more than 
are exposed to the dollar).  Taiwan’s firms no longer exhibit exposure to the dollar. 
A more uniform, but less meaningful, difference in the results is that the
2 R s are 
much lower.  That is, variations in the market return, now out of the regression, had 
accounted for much of the explained variability of individual excess returns.  The exchange 
rates themselves, while extremely volatile and often significant, nevertheless do not 
explain very much of the variation in individual returns.  This is consistent with the bulk of 
empirical work on asset returns, which in general is unable to explain much of the 
variation in returns beyond that explained by their comovement with the market.  Even 
where significant, exchange rate variation by itself contributes only slightly to the 
explained variation of returns.   
 
V.  Summary and Directions for Future Research 
This paper has shown that many East Asian firms are exposed to foreign exchange 
rate risk, particularly to fluctuations in the value of the U.S. dollar.  Their exposure shows 
no signs of abating, and it does not appear to diminish under an exchange rate peg.  The 
exposure among the East Asian firms is much more widespread than typically has been 
reported for firms in the large, western industrialized economies.  It also is more 
widespread than we find among firms in our benchmark countries, Australia and New 14 
Zealand.
8   
We have not investigated whether or not firms should care about this exposure – 
whether the exposure is actually priced in the market and whether it should be hedged.  
However, economic theory (see e.g. Adler and Dumas, 1983) tells us that foreign exchange 
exposure is important when goods markets, not just financial markets, have barriers.  
Goods market segmentation implies a kind of financial market segmentation:  when 
investors’ consumption opportunities differ internationally, the exchange rate will affect 
the way they evaluate the random returns to financial assets.  The East Asian countries 
studied here vary a great deal in terms of the openness of both their capital markets and 
their goods markets.  Thus, the foreign exchange exposure that we document may matter 
very much in some of them and very little in others. We leave the exploration of the 
pricing of exposure and its implications for the development of these markets to future 
research. 
                                                 
8.  However, the extent of exposure we report here is on par with that reported by Dahlquist and Robertsson 
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Table 1:   Weekly Exchange Rate Correlations, 1990-2002   
 
   U.S.  Dollar  DM Yen Pound     
  Hong  Kong      
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.019  1.000     
        Yen  0.002 0.403 1.000  
        Pound  0.037 0.665 0.312 1.000 
  Indonesia      
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.191  1.000     
        Yen  0.190 0.933 1.000  
        Pound  0.198 0.969 0.929 1.000 
  Japan      
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.125  1.000     
     Pound  0.140  0.772      --  1.000 
  Korea      
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.149  1.000     
        Yen  0.149 0.776 1.000  
        Pound  0.157 0.890 0.753 1.000 
  Malaysia     
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.133  1.000     
        Yen  0.117 0.599 1.000  
        Pound  0.143 0.801 0.557 1.000 
  Philippines      
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.160  1.000     
        Yen  0.173 0.698 1.000  
        Pound  0.152 0.853 0.669 1.000 
  Singapore      
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.066  1.000     
        Yen  0.024 0.358 1.000  
        Pound  0.092 0.687 0.288 1.000 
  Taiwan      
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.090  1.000     
        Yen  0.052 0.484 1.000  
        Pound  0.100 0.724 0.421 1.000 
  Thailand     
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.146  1.000     
        Yen  0.151 0.665 1.000  
        Pound  0.154 0.840 0.636 1.000  
 
  Australia      
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.233  1.000     
        Yen  0.243 0.592 1.000  
        Pound  0.238 0.808 0.524 1.000 
  New Zealand     
     U.S. Dollar  1.000       
     DM  0.095  1.000     
        Yen  0.095 0.554 1.000  
        Pound  0.106 0.767 0.508 1.000  
 
 
Table 2:   Residual Foreign Exchange Exposure 
 
t i t t t DM DM t US US t w w t h h t i u s s s s r r r , , £ £ , ¥ ¥ , $, $ , , 0 , + + + + + + + = β β β β γ γ γ  
 
 
  Percent of firms rejecting:   
                                                            H0:  βj=0 at the 5% level  H0:  0 = j β  Median  #  of 
 j  =  US$ DM  ¥    £  j ∀  
2 R       firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
  Hong Kong   --  12  27   0  24  .74    33 
  Indonesia  55  13   7   1  46  .53  100 
  Japan  31   8   --   0  26  .69  100 
  Korea  69   4   2   1  54  .28  100 
  Malaysia  59   2  12   0  44  .31    98 
  Philippines  61   3   6   0  42  .31    33 
  Singapore  44   4  29   2  42  .95    45 
 Taiwan  43  25    2  11  35  .59  100 
  Thailand    2  1   4  11   7  .56  100 
 
  Australia   11   9   6   6  12  .27  100 




Notes:  Observations are taken weekly from January 1990, to March 2002. 
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β β β β γ γ γ  
  Median 
2 R  Exposure  to:  1990-92  1993-95  1996-98  1999-02 
 
Hong Kong:  0.74  Mark  3 0 0 9 
   Yen  27  3  15  3 
    Pound  0 9 0 3 
Indonesia: 0.52  U.S.  Dollar  1  4  58  10 
    Mark  5 5 6 7 
   Yen  0  1  11  11 
    Pound  5 3 2 2 
Japan:  0.69  U.S.  Dollar  18 56 26 15 
   Mark  4  5  31  4 
   Pound  2  13  2  0 
Korea: 0.29  U.S.  Dollar  --  7  65  56 
   Mark  --  4  2  8 
   Yen  --  1  18  2 
   Pound  --  3  3  2 
Malaysia: 0.38  U.S.  Dollar  --  1  60  13 
   Mark  --  1  1  4 
   Yen  --  2  1  32 
   Pound  --  5  0  0 
Philippines: 0.32  U.S.  Dollar  12  9  58  12 
    Mark  0 6 9 0 
    Yen  3 3 3 6 
    Pound  3 6 0 0 
Singapore: 0.95  U.S.  Dollar  0  4  40  7 
    Mark  2 2 8  13 
   Yen  4  0  16  4 
    Pound  4 2 2  13 
Taiwan:  0.69  U.S.  Dollar  3 15 9 38 
   Mark  1  11  14  8 
    Yen  0 2 5 2 
   Pound  2  32  2  6 
Thailand:  0.56  U.S.  Dollar  3 6 2  36 
   Mark  3  14  1  3 
    Yen  1 6 7 5
 Pound  4  1  15  4  
 
Australia: 0.27  U.S.  Dollar  5  7  10  7 
    Mark  7 6 7  13 
  Yen  2 5 7 8 
   Pound  12  5  6  2 
 
New Zealand: 0.57  U.S.  Dollar  3  10  5  8 
    Mark  5 3 3 3 
    Yen  0 3 3  10 
    Pound  5 0 0 3  
Table 4:      Foreign Exchange Exposure and Exchange Rate Arrangements 
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β β γ γ γ  
  Percent of firms rejecting:   
 H 0:       βm=0 at the 5% level  H0: βm=0 Median  #  of 
 m  =  US$ DM  ¥    £  
2 R   firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) 
 
Indonesia  Pegged    0   4  55   8  63  .52  100 
  Nonpegged    2   0  10   1    7 
 
Korea  Pegged  10   0  69   0  39  .28 100 
  Nonpegged    4   2    6   2    4     
 
Malaysia  Pegged   56   6  59    2    3  .40    98 
  Nonpegged   27  12  12   9    7 
 
Philippines  Pegged  42    6  70   9   15  .31    33 
  Nonpegged    0   3    9    0    4 
 
Taiwan  Pegged    2   4  29    2   42  .59  100 
  Nonpegged    4   4  18    2   15 
 
Thailand  Pegged   73  21   31    9    0  .57  100 





Notes:  Observations are taken weekly from January 1990, to March 2002. 
Exchange rates are designated pegged during the following periods:  
  Indonesia, January 1, 1990 to July 1, 1997 
  Korea, January 1, 1990 to October 22, 1997 
  Malaysia, January 1, 1990 to July 12, 1997; and September 1, 1998 to March 7, 2002 
  Philippines, January 1, 1990 to July 12, 1997 
  Taiwan, January 1, 1990 to July 28, 1997 








Table 5:     Total Foreign Exchange Exposure 
t i t t t DM DM t US US t i u s s s s r , , £ £ , ¥ ¥ , $, $ 0 , + + + + + = β β β β γ  
 
 
    Percent of firms rejecting:   
 H 0:βj=0 at the 5% level  H0:  0 = j β  Median  #  of 
 j  =  US$ DM  ¥    £  j ∀  
2 R    firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
  Hong Kong   --   0  39   0  58  .01    33 
  Indonesia   0   7   8   0   7  .01  100 
  Japan   5   24   --  74  19  .00  100 
  Korea  76   5  13   1  67  .08 100 
  Malaysia  82   0  36   0  65  .06    98 
  Philippines  85   0   0   0  58  .03    33 
  Singapore  89   0   2   0  58  .03    45 
  Taiwan   1  35   5   2  18  .01  100 
  Thailand   7   0   1   1  12  .01  100 
 
  Australia   8   4  10   3  12  .00  100 











Appendix Table 1:   Simulated Residual Foreign Exchange Exposure 
 
t i t t t DM DM t US US t w w t h h t i u s s s s r r r , , £ £ , ¥ ¥ , $, $ , , 0 , + + + + + + + = β β β β γ γ γ  
 
 
  Percent of firms rejecting:   
                                                            H0:  βj=0 at the 5% level  H0:  0 = j β  Median  #  of 
 j  =  US$ DM  ¥    £  j ∀  
2 R       firms 
  (1) (2) (3) (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
 
  Hong Kong   --   3   3   3   3  .71    33 
  Indonesia   7   6   6   6   9  .28  100 
  Japan   5   4   --   4   6  .82  100 
  Korea   5   4   4   5   5  .20  100 
  Malaysia   3   3   3   3   3  .32    98 
  Philippines   3   3   6   3   6  .25    33 
  Singapore   4   4   4   4   4  .94    45 
  Taiwan   3   4   4   3   5  .57  100 
  Thailand   5   6   5   5   7  .54  100 
 
  Australia    6   5   5   5   9  .26  100 




Notes:  This table summarizes 25,470 (the total number of firms times the number of 
draws) regressions of actual returns series on simulated exchange rate series.  For each 
country, pseudo-exchange rate returns were generated as mean zero normal random 
variables with standard deviations matching the original exchange rate return series.  
These pseudo-returns were included in each firm-level time-series regression, and the 
number of coefficients statistically different from zero was recorded for each pseudo-
currency.  Then, new exchange rate series were drawn, and the process was repeated thirty 
times before proceeding to the next country.  The table reports the median percent of 
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  Median 
2 R  Exposure  to:  1990-92  1993-95  1996-98  1999-02 
Hong Kong:  0.74  Mark  3 3 0 9 
   Yen  21  3  12  3 
    Pound  3 9 0 3 
Indonesia: 0.53  U.S.  Dollar  7  5  3  20 
    Mark  7 12 8  6 
   Yen  7  0  1  13 
   Pound  11  5  3  3 
Japan: 0.70  U.S.  Dollar  4  58  44  8 
   Mark  1  3  39  5 
    Pound  1 12 2  1 
Korea: 0.29  U.S.  Dollar  --  5  40  53 
   Mark  --  3  2  7 
   Yen  --  4  15  5 
   Pound  --  5  1  3 
Malaysia: 0.39  U.S.  Dollar  --  4  39  14 
   Mark  --  4  1  4 
   Yen  --  3  2  32 
   Pound  --  6  2  1 
Philippines: 0.34  U.S.  Dollar  3  9  33  9 
    Mark  0 6 9 3 
    Yen  0 0 6 6 
    Pound  3 9 0 3 
Singapore: 0.95  U.S.  Dollar  24  4  20  18 
   Mark  2  2  9  13 
   Yen  4  4  13  7 
   Pound  7  4  0  20 
Taiwan:  0.59  U.S.  Dollar  1 21 4 42 
   Mark  0  17  17  11 
    Yen  0 0 6 2 
    Pound  2 40 3  6 
Thailand: 0.56  U.S.  Dollar  4  7  5  47 
    Mark  3 16 1  3 
    Yen  5 8 4 6 
    Pound  7 1 8 4 
 
Australia: 0.27  U.S.  Dollar  5  7  10  7 
   Mark  6  6  8  13 
    Yen  2 4 6 7 
   Pound  13  6  7  2 
 
New Zealand: 0.58  U.S.  Dollar  0  0  10  7 
    Mark  5 0 0 3 
   Yen  3  3  3  10 
   Pound  10  0  0  3 
 